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THE AVAILABILITY OF THE "CULTURAL DEFENSE"
AS AN EXCUSE FOR CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the best known maxim of criminal law is that "ignorance
of the law is no excuse."I The traditional reasoning behind this maxim
is that the recognition of ignorance as a defense to criminal activity
would place the defendant's knowledge of the law, or lack thereof,
above the law in determining what he could or could not do.2 The
ignorance of the law doctrine is universally recognized.'
Recently, California defense lawyers have challenged this maxim
on behalf of Asian immigrants who have been criminally prosecuted
for behavior that is considered acceptable in their homelands, but is
illegal in the United States.4 These attorneys have used a novel theory,
called the "cultural defense," 5 in an attempt to convince the courts
to excuse their clients' crimes. The response of United States courts
to this theory is significant because it stems from an increasingly
I See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 258 (1945); Armour
Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 85-86 (1908).
Ignorance of the law is distinguishable from mistake of the law. A person falls
under the former if "he did not know that any relevant legal prohibition existed,"
but he is under the latter "if he did know [a] potentially relevant rule, [but] decided
it did not include his intended situation or conduct." J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINAL LAW 382 (2d ed. 1960).
2 The harshness of this traditional rule when applied in particular cases has been
justified by statements from such revered scholars as Oliver Wendell Holmes, who
has stated that "justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interest
on the other side of the scales." 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (1881).
The more modern ard realistic justifications given for the rule are that a "mistake
of law defense would encourage ignorance rather than a determination to know the
law, and would interfere with the enforcement of the law, because the claim would
be so easy to assert and hard to disprove." United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940,
964-65 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., dissenting). See also Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F.
Supp. 463, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
HALL, supra note 1, at 381.
Sherman, Legal Clash of Cultures, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 5, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
The main assertion under the "cultural defense" is that the newcomers' actions
are shaped by their own culture; therefore, they do not have the requisite state of
mind to be found guilty of the crime under United States law. Id. at 26, col. 1.
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urgent problem in the United States - the collision of foreign cultures
with the United States legal system.6
One recent California case exemplifies the effect of these cultural
differences on the criminal prosecution of a foreign newcomer. 7
Defendant, a Hmong tribesman,' was charged with kidnapping and
rape for practicing a Laotian form of marriage called "zij poj niam." 9
At trial, the kidnapping and rape charges were dropped and the
defendant pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor of false imprisonment. 0
At the sentencing hearing, lawyers debated whether the marriage ritual
was a valid tradition in the United States, since several generations
of tribesmen had lived in this country." After hearing the parties'
testimony and reviewing a doctoral dissertation on Hmong marriage
rituals, the trial judge reduced the defendant's sentence from 180 to
This conflict has been aggravated by the rising population of immigrants and
refugees, most of whom are Asian. The 1965 amendment to the Immigration Act
placed a ceiling of 20,000 on the number of immigrants that any given country may
send to the United States each year. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a). Asians now represent the
largest group of new arrivals. Sherman, supra note 4, at 26, col. 1. State Department
figures show that Asians have accounted for 40% of all immigrants for the past 20
years. Id. Nearly 60% of the 4.1 million Asians in the United States today are
foreign-born. Id.
7 People v. Moua, No. 315972-0 (Fresno Cnty. Super. Ct., Feb. 7, 1985).
8 The Hmong are Laotian mountain tribesman who fought as United States allies
in the Vietnam war. About 60,000 of these tribesmen have resettled in the United
States, with one-third residing in California. King, Transplanted Hmong: Adjustment
in Fresno, L.A. Times, Apr. 7, 1985, at 1, col. 4. In addition, nearly 800,000
Indochinese refugees have been given permanent asylum in the United States since
the Communist takeover in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in 1975. Sherman, supra
note 4, at 26, col. I.
This ritual, known as "marriage-by-capture," is practiced in the mountains of
Laos. "Zij poj niam" is the tribesman's customary way of claiming a young bride.
Sherman, supra note 4, at 26, col. 3.
In the instant case, the would-be Hmong suitor proceeded with the ancient
pattern of courting his bride-to-be by flirting and taking her on chaperoned dates.
After four months of this courtship, he then took the final step - consummation
of the union at his family's home. She resisted, which is the Hmong custom.
Thompson, The Cultural Defense, 14 STUDENT LAWYER 25, 27 (1985).
According to Hmong tradition, the woman is required to weep and moan and
declare that she is not ready. Otherwise, she is not considered virtuous. Sometimes,
as in this case, the woman continues to deny interest when questioned by the police.
Thus, authorities have difficulty in determining whether a rape has actually occurred.
Thompson, "Cultural Defense" in California, Wall St. J., June 6, 1985, at 28, col.
5.
Sherman, supra note 4, at 27, col. I.
Moua, No. 315972-0 (Fresno Cnty. Super. Ct., Feb. 7, 1985). See also Thompson,
supra note 9.
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90 days in jail."2 Following the trial, the prosecuting attorney stated
that "jludging from the sentence," the judge had implicitly recog-
nized the "cultural defense."' 3
To date, United States courts have not recognized the "cultural de-
fense" as an excuse 4 for crimes. This attitude stems from their refusal
to accept cultural differences, or any other individual characteristics, 5
as an excuse for ignorance of the law. To recognize cultural factors
alone as the basis of a criminal excuse would create an exception to
the "ignorance is no excuse" maxim for a special segment of the
population. 6 Rather than address the "cultural defense" issue,' 7 courts
have merely incorporated cultural factors into other traditional de-
fense theories." Thus, rather than acknowledge the "cultural defense"
and waive sanctions against criminal perpetrators completely under the
excuse doctrine, the courts have left the defense in an undefined and
ambiguous state. Initially, this attitude seems unfair to immigrant
defendants. However, this approach is sound, due to the availability
of other traditional defenses,' 9 the potential repercussions of adopting
the "cultural defense" into the United States legal system,", the unfair
policy that the defense would represent towards the majority who
could not use it,"1 and the potential violation of the principle of
legality .22
2 Moua, No. 315972-0 (Fresno Cnty. Super. Ct., Feb. 7, 1985).
Thompson, supra note 9, at 28 (quoting Deputy District Attorney Eugene
Martinez).
,4 The theory of excuse in criminal law concedes that an act is wrongful, but
seeks to exculpate the defendant from criminal liability because of some flaw in his
personal capacity to avoid committing an intentional wrong. Insanity is the classic
example of excuse. Clark, Witchcraft and Legal Pluralism: The Case of Celimo
Mirquirucama, 15 TULSA L.J. 679, 696 (1980).
15 See, e.g., State v. Carr, 95 N.M. 755, 626 P.2d 292, cert. denied, 454 U.S.
853 (1981) (defendant doctor convicted of intentionally obtaining a prescription drug
by fraud, where he only wrote a prescription and never had actual possession of
the drug, despite his ignorance that possession could also be constructive); State v.
Montoya, 91 N.M. 262, 572 P.2d 1270 (1977) (defendant convicted of carrying a
firearm into a licensed liquor establishment, despite his ignorance that the act was
a crime).
'1 See infra pp. 350-51 for the proposition that the creation of an exception to the
law for the immigrants would be unfair to other United States residents.
,7 Sherman, supra note 4, at 1, col. 2.
" See infra 339-48.
19 Id.
20 See infra text accompanying notes 71-96.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 97-105.
22 See infra text accompanying notes 106-112.
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II. IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
The idea that ignorance of the law - the mistaken belief that
one's conduct is lawful - is no excuse for criminal behavior is not
an absolute rule. 23 Ignorance of the law does constitute a defense
"when it negatives the existence of a mental state essential to the
crime charged." '2 4 For example, some statutes establish a legal duty
to act and prohibit a "willful" or "knowing" violation of that duty. 25
If a defendant violates the statute by failing to do what is required
because he is unaware of the statute, then ignorance of the law may
be an accepted excuse.2 6 However, an unknowing violation of a statute
will not be excused, even where knowledge is required, if the defendant
acts on a false belief that his conduct is legal. 27 Courts distinguish
these two situations by emphasizing that in the former the defendant
claims to lack the mental state required to commit the crime. 21 In
23 See, e.g., United States v. Petito, 519 F. Supp. 838, 841 (E.D.N.Y. 1981),
aff'd 671 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Squires, 440 F.2d 859, 863-64
(2d Cir. 1971).
24 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, § 47, at 356 (1972).
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), which provides
in pertinent part that:
Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if:
(a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief,
recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of
the offense.
Id. § 2.04(a).
25 See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (statute established duty
of convicted felon to register with the local police if he remained in the city more
than five days and prohibited a knowing violation); Hargrove v. United States, 67
F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1933) (statute established a duty to file an income tax return and
prohibited a willful failure to do so).
26 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 225 (former felon not at fault for failing to be aware
of duty to register); Hargrove, 67 F.2d at 820 (defendant not at fault for failing
to file income taxes since he was unaware of the duty to file).
27 United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
The statute in this case was a specialized regulation of the Interstate Commerce
Commission addressing the shipment of dangerous chemicals. The defendant shipped
sulfuric acid in interstate commerce without classifying the substance on shipping
papers, as required by the statute. The Court did not require proof that the defendant
knew that its omission concerning the shipping papers was illegal. It only required
proof that the defendant knew that the papers were not completed. Id. See also
United States v. Currier, 621 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1980) (statute required that the defendant
knowingly fail to maintain records of firearm sales to be guilty of a violation, but
did not require proof of the defendant's knowledge that he was violating federal
statutory law).
21 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 24, at 365 n.73.
For example, in Lambert, discussed supra notes 25-26, the defendant was pros-
ecuted for ignorance of a duty - simply being present in a city and not registering
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other words, he did not know what he was doing. In the latter the
defendant admittedly has the intent (or other mental state) to commit
the act, but is unaware that it is proscribed by the criminal law. 29
In short, he knew what he was doing, but did not know that he was
breaking the law. Ignorance may be used as a defense in the first
situation, but not in the second, because a defendant is expected to
know the rules governing the action he chooses to take. 0
In applying the above rules to cases involving crimes by immigrants,
if a foreign newcomer performs an act that constitutes a crime in
the United States, then he is assumed to know the law governing his
act. He will not be excused unless his ignorance negates the requisite
mental state of the crime charged. For example, if the Hmong defen-
dant had shown that he did not know that rape was a crime, he still
could have been convicted of rape as long as he intended to have
sexual intercourse without the victim's consent. His adherence to
cultural tradition would not excuse his criminal behavior under the
ignorance of the law defense.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE "CULTURAL DEFENSE"
Although it is likely that United States courts will reject the
"cultural defense" under the "ignorance is no excuse" maxim,
the courts still may consider cultural conflicts under other tra-
ditional defense theories.3 These traditional theories recognize
unique personal characteristics32 as an excuse for criminal be-
with the police because she was unaware of the statute. See also United States v.
Rosenfield, 469 F.2d 598, 601 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973)
(proposition that ignorance of a crime is no excuse, but ignorance of a duty may
be if willful state of mind is required).
29 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 24, at 362. For example, in International
Minerals & Chemical Corp., discussed supra note 27, the corporate defendant was
prosecuted for ignorance of a crime - knowingly undertaking an activity that was
prohibited by statute. 402 U.S. at 558. See also United States v. Gregg, 612 F.2d
43 (2d Cir. 1972) (in prosecution for conspiring with, aiding and abetting the
embezzlers of funds, the defendant did not have to be aware of the federal statute
proscribing his conduct in order to be found guilty of willful violation).
30 See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 24, at 362. The authors
indicate that a more satisfactory explanation for the "ignorance is no excuse" maxim
is that an ignorance-of-the-criminal-law defense, if available to all defendants, would
make the defendant's claim of ignorance hard to refute and his fault in being
ignorant hard to determine. Id. at 363.
' See infra text accompanying notes 36-70.
12 Individual characteristics are subjective factors. A subjective standard "imposes
criminal sanctions on an individual who voluntarily violated a legal obligation which
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havior13 or consider such characteristics as mitigating factors in re-
ducing the punishment for illegal behavior.3 4 Thus, under these tra-
ditional defenses, foreign newcomers may assert their native traditions
and beliefs to lessen or negate criminal liability." However, they may
not use these other defenses to circumvent the laws that all other
persons in the United States must obey, because these defenses do
not create an exception to the laws for immigrant groups. All criminal
defendants may avail themselves of these traditional defenses. On
the other hand, the "cultural defense" theory creates an unfair ex-
ception to criminal laws for newcomers by allowing their ignorance
of United States laws to be an excuse for acts that long-term residents
of the United States would be subject to criminal liability for despite
their ignorance. The creation of a special exception for immigrant
defendants, by allowing the "cultural defense" coupled with the avail-
ability of other defenses that do not create this unfair exception,
supports the argument that the "cultural defense" theory should not
be recognized by courts.
A. The "Diminished Responsibility" Defense
One traditional defense theory that may be used by immigrants
who are prosecuted for crimes in the United States is the "diminished
responsibility" defense.36 The "diminished responsibility" defense is
he could have obeyed." Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Re-
sponsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
827, 831 n.21 (1977).
In other words, a subjective evaluation focuses on the situation as the individual
defendant viewed it - not as an objectively reasonable defendant would have viewed
it. An objective standard imposes criminal liability "whenever the individual's conduct
has threatened or harmed social interests protected by the criminal law without
regard to the actor's subjective culpability." Id.
One commentator uses the defense of duress to explain the difference between
the two standards: A subjective theory of criminal liability "would require proof
that an offender was actually coerced into committing" the crime. An objective
theory would require proof "that a reasonable person, endowed with all the char-
acteristics believed necessary to serve the social control function of the criminal law,
would have acted as the defendant did." Id.
" See infra text accompanying note 50.
14 See infra text accompanying note 37.
11 Non-immigrant defendants may theoretically assert their individual beliefs and
customs under these defenses since they are based on the existence of certain states
of mind, whether or not the mental conditions are culture-related. See infra text
accompanying notes 37 and 51.
16 The "diminished responsibility" defense was introduced in England by statute
in 1957. Section 2 of the English Homicide Act of 1957 provides, in relevant part,
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used in cases where a defendant suffered from an abnormal mental
condition at the time of the crime, but the condition was not sufficient
to constitute legal insanity.3 7 The theory behind this defense is that
the abnormality may still be relevant in determining whether a person
is guilty of the crime charged or whether he is guilty of a lesser
offense.18 Under this defense, the defendant's unique condition is a
mitigating factor that reduces his punishment.3 9
The "diminished responsibility" defense has been recognized in
England, 40 Australia,4' and other countries. 42 The defense has been
accepted mainly in homicide cases, 43 but is not limited to such cases
in the United States. 44 While the defense has not been expressly
that:
(1) Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall
not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality
of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded
development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or
injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts
and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.
(3) A person who but for this section would be liable, whether as principal
or as accessory, to be convicted of murder shall be liable instead to
be convicted of manslaughter.
Homicide Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. II § 2(1), (3) (1957).
31 The "diminished responsibility" defense has been accepted by the English courts
in cases involving certain mental conditions of the defendant, such as "mercy killing"
and murder during a state of severe depression or chronic anxiety. T. GARDNER &
V. MANIAN, CRIMINAL LAW 105 (2d ed. 1980).
18 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 24, at 326.
9 In these cases, there is a "societal determination that it is unfair to punish as
severely the person who lacks a certain degree of understanding or control of his
actions." Comment, The Relevance of Innocence: Proposition 8 and the Diminished
Capacity Defense, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1197, 1200 (1983). See generally Annot., 22
A.L.R.3d 1228 (1968).
40 See Homicide Act, supra note 36.
4 Australia recognizes a defense analogous to "diminished responsibility" to
reduce punishments for native aborigines. Clark, supra note 14, at 694. In one case,
an aborigine speared his wife for adultery, a practice which was condoned by his
tribal law. He was sentenced to one year in jail for manslaughter, but the judge
ruled that he would receive an early release if prison had a negative effect upon
him. The judge used a tribal witchdoctor to measure the effect. Regina v. Muddarruba
(unpublished opinion of the Australian Northern Territory Supreme Court, reprinted
in J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWTIZ & R. SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND
PROCESS, 994-98 (1974)).
42 Scotland and Italy also recognize the defense. Arenella, supra note 32, at 830
n.16.
41 See supra note 37.
- See infra text accompanying notes 47-49. The Moua case did not include
homicide.
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adopted by any American jurisdiction, 45 various versions of the con-
cept have been accepted by state courts.4 "Similar results are also
obtained through the American plea bargaining system, under which
American prosecutors consider the factors which comprise the defense
. . . and permit defendants to plead guilty to reduced charges." '47
The Moua case illustrates the use of the plea bargaining system to
afford the defendant a defense that resembles "diminished respon-
sibility" in that the prosecuting attorney dropped the rape and kid-
napping charges and allowed the tribesman to plead guilty to a lesser
offense. 48 Also, the trial judge reduced the tribesman's sentence.4 1
Possibly, the prosecutor and judge made these changes in recognition
of the tribesman's cultural heritage as a mitigating factor.
Another recent case exemplifies the use of the American plea-
bargaining system to impliedly recognize the cultural origin of a
defendant's crime. 0 Defendant, a Japanese woman, tried to commit
"oyako-shinju," a traditional ritual of parent-child suicide.', She was
charged with first-degree murder, and could have been sentenced
to a maximum of thirteen years in prison." Although "oyako-shinju"
is prohibited under Japanese law, the punishment is considerably less
harsh than murder under United States law.54 The moderate legal sanction
41 Arenella, supra note 32, at 830.
" T. GARDNER & V. MANAN, supra note 37, at 105-06.
'1 Id. at 106.
41 See infra text accompanying note 10.
19 See infra text accoompanying note 12. The amount of weight given the defen-
dant's native custom by the court in its decision was not clear because the decision
was not recorded. Thus, there is little guidance for future cases involving immigrants,
other than an indication of willingness to consider a person's cultural heritage to
mitigate his punishment.
lo People v. Kimura, No. A091133 (Santa Monica Super. Ct., Nov. 21, 1985).
1' "Oyako-shinju" is committed by the Japanese mother to escape some personal
disgrace or shame. It occurs at least once a day in Japan and is considered an
honorable way to die. The Japanese, however, consider it to be a disgrace for a
mother to take her own life and to leave the children motherless. Dolan, Mother
Facing Charges in Ceremonial Drowning, L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, § 1, at 3, col.
1.
In Kimura, the defendant was emotionally distressed after learning that her
husband had supported a mistress for three years. She took her two children on a
long bus ride from their home to the beach. She then walked into the ocean with
her children in her arms. Passersby attempted a rescue, but only the mother survived.
Sherman, supra note 4, at 1, col. 3.
52 Sherman, supra note 4, at 1, col. 3.
51 Atlanta J. & Const., Nov. 22, 1985, at 4A, col. 1.
14 According to members of the Los Angeles Japanese community who defended
the mother's actions, the defendant would be charged in Japan with involuntary
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reflects the attitude of the Japanese people, who do not morally
condemn the act." In fact, the defendant in this case received an
outpouring of support from the Los Angeles Japanese community.5 6
According to the defense attorney, the defense was based on the
reports of nine clinical psychiatrists, two of whom were familiar with
Japanese culture, that the defendant was "temporariy insane" at the
time of the crime." While he did not base the defense on primarily
cultural factors, the attorney theorized that the defendant's native
Japanese beliefs may have led her to be "more vulnerable" to the
stress created by her domestic situation."'
Prior to the trial, the prosecuting attorneys examined the psychiatric
reports and then entered into plea negotiations with the defendant.5 9
As a result, the defendant pleaded no contest to two reduced charges
of involuntary manslaughter. 60 The sentence, which was approved by
the prosecution, was for five years' probation, psychiatric treatment,
and one year in the county jail with credit for time already served. 6'
The defense attorney noted that one can only speculate unofficially
about the effect of cultural factors on the prosecution's decision to
reduce the charges. 62 However, in view of the massive public support
for the defendant and the unique Japanese origin of her actions, the
influence of her cultural conflict on the plea negotiations was likely.
B. The "Mistake of Fact" Defense
A second traditional defense that foreign newcomers may use suc-
cessfully to assert their cultural differences is the "mistake of fact"
manslaughter or a lesser offense, and would only receive a "light, suspended sentence,
probation and supervised rehabilitation." Sherman, supra note 4, at 26, col. 1.
1 See Hayashi, Understanding Shinju and the Tragedy of Fumiko Kimura, L.A.
Times, Apr. 10, 1985, § 2 at 5, col. I. See also Brazil, Mother Who Drowned Kids
Pits Justice Against Culture, USA Today, Oct. 18, 1,985, at 3A, col. 2.
56 See supra note 55.
Telephone interview with defense attorney Gerald H. Klausher (Feb. 18, 1986).
' Id. The defendant's domestic life was disrupted by her husband's infidelity,
which was a source of great shame to her. Prior to the trial, the defense attorney
stated that he expected the psychiatric reports to show that the defendant's condition
of insanity developed when she learned of the husband's unfaithfulness ten days
prior to the suicide attempt. Atlanta J. & Const., Sept. 1, 1985, at 15A, col. 6
(quoting defense attorney Gerald H. Klausher).
" See supra note 57.
' See supra note 52.
"' See supra note 52.
6- See supra note 57.
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defense. 63 Under this defense, a standard measuring the actor's sub-
jective state of mind, as opposed to an objective standard, determines
whether or not he is held responsible for committing a crime.64 Thus,
the immigrant defendant's unique beliefs and societal norms, which
are a part of his subjective state of mind, can be considered by the
courts in determining the immigrant's criminal responsibility.
A mistake of fact will be a defense if it negates the existence of
the state of mind essential to the crimeAl A mistake negates the state
of mind, or criminal intent, when the defendant's act would have
been lawful if the facts were as he supposed them to be.6 To be
relieved of criminal liability under this defense, the defendant must
show that his mistake was an honest one and that his behavior was
prompted by this mistake. 67
The mistake of fact defense may be applied in cases involving
crimes by immigrants. For example, in Moua the Hmong tribesman might
have defended against the rape charge on the ground that he honestly
and reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that the young woman had
consented to sexual intercourse. 68 The Hmong tradition requires the
bride-to-be to resist her suitor, even if she is pleased to participate
in the act. 69 In light of this custom, the tribesman could have made
an honest mistake concerning the woman's consent, and it would
61 Mistake of fact is distinguishable from mistake of law. "Law is expressed in
distinctive propositions, whereas facts are qualities or events occurring at definite
places and times" that are "directly sensed in perception and introspection." HALL,
supra note 1, at 376.
The actor's subjective interpretation of a situation, and not the actual situation,
which is objectively measured, determines his moral obligation. The ethical principle
behind this defense is that "[i]f the actual fact determined our duties, we would
sometimes be under a moral obligation without knowing it." Id. at 363.
6 See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 24, at 356. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.04(1), supra note 24.
Barker v. United States, 546 F.2d. 940, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
61 T. GARDNER & V. MANIAN, supra note 35, at 121.
Under the better view, even an unreasonable mistake of fact, if honest, will be
a valid defense. Barker, 546 F.2d at 948 n.23.
61 An honest and reasonable mistake of fact as to whether the victim has consented
to sexual intercourse is a defense to the crime of rape. See, e.g., People v. Acevedo,
166 Cal. App. 3d 196, 212 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1985) (proper jury instruction stated that
a reasonable and good-faith belief that the victim consented was a defense to a
charge of forcible rape); State v. Dizon, 47 Hawaii 444, 466, 390 P.2d 759, 769
(1964) (proposition that if the defendant's belief in his victim's consent was honest,
he still is guilty of rape if his mistake was due to his negligence, fault, or carelessness).
6 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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have been reasonable ° for him to believe that her resistance was a
mere pretense. Thus, his mistake would negate the criminality of his
act, and he would be excused entirely.
IV. THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY RECOGNITION
OF A "CULTURAL DEFENSE"
The Moua case and others71 present an ethical and social question
as to whether foreign newcomers should be held responsible for crimes
under United States law. Lack of cultural conformity and ignorance
of United States law by such people pose serious threats to
the court systems and communities in which they settle. The legal
issue is whether the courts should accept the cultural defense as a
separate defense that is exempt from the "ignorance is no excuse"
idea or limit the assertion of cultural conflicts to traditional defense
theories, such as "diminished responsibility" and mistake of fact,
that recognize individual customs and beliefs.
If the "cultural defense" is formally recognized by American courts
as an excuse for crimes, four acute problems will surface immediately:
(1) defining which groups of defendants may assert the defense, (2)
maintaining the deterrent effect of the criminal law on these groups,
(3) maintaining fairness to the majority of Americans who cannot
use the defense, and (4) upholding the principle of legality.
A. Defining Defendant Groups
The difficulties that the courts will face in deciding which defendant
groups may use the "cultural defense" present themselves in two
stages. The first stage involves the burden of separating the group
of bona fide foreign newcomers from other cultural minority groups
who may try to abuse the protection that the defense offers. Once
the foreign newcomers are defined as a group, the courts must then
define them as individuals. Hence, the second stage of problems
involves the dilemma of separating the individual defendants who
may legitimately assert the defense from those who are sufficiently
"enculturated" to be held responsible for their actions.
, As stated previously (supra note 52), an honest and unreasonable mistake will
usually be a valid defense. However, some jurisdictions (see supra note 53) retained
a reasonableness requirement for the crime of rape because of the morally repre-
hensible nature of the crime.
" There are numerous cases involving the Hmong marriage-by-capture ritual, but
Moua is the only one to reach a formal disposition. Sherman, supra note 4, at 27,
col. 1.
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The first stage of problems in defining defendant groups will arise
if the courts are bombarded with people who see the "cultural de-
fense" as a privilege or advantage by which to circumvent the criminal
justice system." These people might claim to belong to a certain group,
or even join one, in order to claim the benefit of the defense."' Many
fear that "if the American judicial system were to make allowances for
all the foreign practices brought here by immigrants, were to allow ig-
norance to be an excuse, the 'cultural defense' would become a buzz-
word for chaos and crime .... ""
The problem of defendants wrongfully seeking the shelter of the
"cultural defense" has already surfaced. Some native minority
groups which cultivate their own beliefs and customs
seek to evade the criminal law under the pretense that their own
standards and tradition are controlling. One example is a recent
California case where a black man sought to defend himself
against a charge of rape. 75 The defendant contended that he rea-
sonably, but mistakenly, believed that the black female victim
consented to sexual intercourse because she did not sufficiently
manifest her refusal. He alleged that the woman submitted to him
after he "spoke loudly" to her, which was alleged to be custom-
ary among blacks.76 At trial, the defendant sought to introduce
the testimony of a black psychologist to the effect that black
people customarily speak very loudly to each other. 77 The court
flatly rejected admission of the testimony, finding that "the nat-
ural result of such proffered testimony [would be] the creation of
a new defense to the crime of rape," which is not permissible.7 8
Accordingly, the court held that no race or group may set its
own standards of conduct and reasonableness to apply to non-
consenting invidivuals in the context of rape.79 In reaching this
conclusion, the court apparently recognized that allowing a cul-
turally-based defense by a native minority group80 would open the
72 See Samuels, Legal Recognition and Protection of Minority Customs in a Plural
Society in England, 10 ANGLO-AM. L. REV., 241, 254 (1981).
73 Id.
14 Atlanta J. & Const., supra note 58, at col. 4.
1 People v. Rhines, 131 Cal. App. 3d 498, 182 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1982).
I6 d. at 500, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
77 Id.
I7 d. at 500, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
79 Id.
- One example of these native minority groups is indigenous Native Americans.
See Sherman, supra note 4, at 27, col. 3. (discussing Oregon case where three Indians
allegedly murdered a white man who they believed was disturbing burial grounds
in search of marketable Indian artifacts).
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floodgates to numerous other groups seeking to avoid the crimi-
nal law. 8
After legitimate defendant groups have been separated from un-
recognized ones, the individuals within the former group who may
properly assert the "cultural defense" must be distinguished from
those who may not. In this second stage, courts will encounter certain
problems in making the separation of individuals. One such problem
will be the task of deciding how long a person may reside in the
United States and still be considered a recent immigrant who may
be legitimately ignorant of United States laws. The courts must es-
tablish a termination point after which a defendant is considered to
be enculturated. Because the circumstances of each case will vary,
however, the courts must make a separate inquiry into each defen-
dant's opportunity for orientation. One person may learn about
American culture and legal standards within a few weeks, while
another may remain ignorant for years.
The Kimura case illustrates the difficulty in determining a cut-off
time for a defendant's use of the "cultural defense. ' s2 As previously
noted, the defense attorney based the woman's defense on psychiatric
reports that she was insane at the time of the suicide attempt.83 If
a "cultural defense" had been recognized by the court at that time,
it might not have been available to the defendant. While her native
traditions probably played a role in her sentence reduction, her ability
to assert a defense based on cultural factors alone would have been
doubtful since she had lived in the United States for fourteen years.8 4
The length of her residence in this country would cast uncertainty
on her ignorance of United States laws illustrating the dilemma that
courts would face in setting a termination point for the defense on
a case-by-case basis.
As noted, the courts must determine the appropriate cut-off time
for each person's use of the defense if they are to define the defendant
1, Under the view of this Note, the court's refusal to accept cultural factors under
the mistake of fact defense in this case does not contradict the assertion, in supra
notes 63-70, that a mistake of fact defense may be based on cultural grounds by
foreign newcomers, as distinguished from native minorities.
12 Kimura, No. A091133 (Santa Monica Super. Ct., Nov. 21, 1985).
81 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
14 Although she has lived in America for several years, the defendant has reportedly
maintained a strict Japanese lifestyle. She does speak English, but not in the home.
Also, she does not drive a car, has no personal interests or friends outside of the
family, and knows nothing of her husband's business affairs. Dolan, supra note 51,
at 30, col. 1.
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groups who may assert it. The courts must also consider the type of
culture from which each defendant came. Each of the many foreign
cultures represented in the United States has its own special customs
and beliefs. Thus, there is a great disparity among immigrant groups.
Several factors influence this disparity, such as differences in edu-
cations, standards of living, working habits, and family relationships.
Some countries may have ample exposure to American customs,
language, and law, while others may be virtually isolated.85 The courts
will have to decide if such diverse groups should receive the same
protection from criminal sanctions or whether different levels of
exemption should be applied.
B. Maintaining Deterrence Through Criminal Law
The second major problem that American courts will face if the
"cultural defense" is formally recognized is maintaining the deterrent
effect of the criminal law on immigrant groups. Under the defense,
a person's ignorance of American law is completely excused. Thus,
allowing the use of the defense will remove the incentive for the
foreign newcomers to learn the laws of their adopted country. If
their incentive to learn about the judicial system is dimin-
ished, their communities will likely continue to fluctuate between
following the newcomers' alien customs and those of their newly adopted
American ways. This will "increase the public uncertainty and con-
fusion as to what conduct [is] criminal." ' 86 Confusion among new-
comers about the rules that govern their criminal behavior can,
logically, only lead to an increase in their disobedience of those rules.
Eventually, their respect for the rules will decay, and the persons
who abide by the laws will suffer at the hands of those who do not.
To avoid this negative result, the courts should uphold the "ignorance
is no excuse" maxim without making an exception for immigrant
groups.
By rejecting the "cultural defense," and therefore not excusing the
immigrants' ignorance, the courts will encourage them to adapt more
quickly to the legal system of their new homeland. This hastened
adaptation by the newcomers to unfamiliar laws may aid their as-
similation into other aspects of life in the United States. The United
1 For example, the Hmong refugees had no written language of their own until
30 years ago when missionaries visited the region. Sherman, supra note 4, at 26,
col. 3.
86 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 24, at 364.
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States lifestyle is easier to adopt for immigrant groups who come from
more modern countries, such as Japan and Korea. 'Groups like the
Hmongs, however, have had little exposure to the western world.8 7 Thus,
"even the simple rules and regulations of everyday life.., can be con-
fusing. ' 88 For example, the Hmong have an intense fear of American
police officers.8 9 It is not uncommon for them to put their hands on
their heads and kneel to the ground, in an "execution position"
when they are pulled over by police for routine traffic violations. 9°
A better understanding of law enforcement and the legal system in
the United States would help to alleviate this misunderstanding.
The Hmong also have a habit of butchering pigs in their back-
yards. 91 This custom violates local ordinances and disturbs other
residents in the neighborhoods. 92 If the tribesmen are warned by the
police and punished by the courts for violating these laws, then
perhaps they will alter their custom of food preparation. The Hmong's
conformity will bring them within the law, thereby encouraging a
better relationship between them and the Americans into whose com-
munities they have settled. This process of conformance is known as
"enculturation." 93
The potential for these foreign cultures to survive in a sometimes
hostile western environment demands partial enculturation with the
dominant American society. 94 The punishment of newcomers under
the criminal law aids this process by bringing United States
laws to the attention of the immigrant communities. These
communities will either adopt the American laws that govern acts
for which their homelands had no restrictions and will alter those
traditions that directly conflict with these laws, or they will be prosecuted
for violating these laws. The deterrent effect of the criminal law on these
communities is evident in the case of the Hmongs, who are already ad-
Sherman, supra note 4, at 26, col. 3.
' Id.
Thompson, supra note 9, at 27, col. 1.
' Id. at 27, col. 2.
9I Id.
92 Id.
9 "Enculturation" is "the process by which an individual learns the traditional
content of a culture and assimilates its practices and values." WEBSTER'S THnR NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 747 (1967). It should be distinguished from "acculturation"
which refers to the change induced in one culture by its encounter with another.
P. FARB, MAN'S RISE TO CIVILIZATION: THE CULTURAL ASCENT OF THE INDIANS OF
NORTH AMERICA 247, 251-52 (2d rev. ed. 1978).
- Clark, supra note 14, at 697-98.
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justing their customs to comply with the new laws that they have learned
in the United States." The courts must continuously reinforce this en-
culturation process because "even as the older immigrants begin to adopt
the ways of their new country, the steady flow of arrivals presents a con-
tinuing challenge to the legal system.' 9 6
C. Maintaining Fairness to the Majority
As previously noted, the courts' refusal to accept the "cultural
defense" will pressure foreign newcomers to conform to the American
identity. Forcing the immigrants to adjust their native customs by
prosecuting them for crimes may be seen by some commentators as
endangering the immigrants' individuality and cultural heritage. 7 The
reasoning behind this view is twofold. First, immigrant cultures offer
some valuable elements to enrich national life generally. 9 Second,
respect for the individual and his personal beliefs is an integral part
of human rights. 99
The view that opposes the immigrant's conformity to the dominant
American culture is accurate in many respects. Admittedly, the courts'
current practice of sweeping the "cultural defense" under the umbrella
of other traditional defenses'00 is not infallible. This approach by the
courts may impinge upon the newcomers' personal and community
identity. However, the opposing view fails to consider "the larger
interest on the other side of the scales," referred to by Justice
Holmes. 10
The "larger interest on the other side" that tips the scale in favor
of denying the "cultural defense" is the interest of American society.
Long-term residents of the United States who are criminally prose-
91 Thompson, supra note 9, at 29, col. 2 (referring to the Hmong tribesmen who
have followed the rape cases and have begun to adjust their traditions accordingly).
Sherman, supra note 4, at 26, col. 3.
The greatest influx of aliens into the United States since the 1920's occurred in
1984. N. GLAZER, CLAMOR AT THE GATES: THE NEW AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 3 (1985).
Immigration of Asians into America rose 146% in the 1970's, and the pace has
accelerated since 1980 due to the flight of the Indochinese refugees from the political
unrest in Southeast Asia. Id. at 8.
91 Samuels, supra note 72, at 255.
~'Id.
SId.
", The current treatment of the "cultural defense" as only a mitigating factor
under the "diminished responsibility" defense is exemplified by the Moua case.
Moua, No. 315972-0 (Fresno Cnty. Super. Ct., Feb. 7, 1985).
"l See supra note 2.
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cuted may not resort to the ignorance of the law defense except
under very limited circumstances.° 2 In general, their individual reasons
for being unaware of the existence of a particular law will not
exculpate them. 0 3 Thus, it is unfair to allow foreign-born defendants
to assert their individual beliefs and customs as an excuse for criminal
behavior, when the majority of the public is not allowed to assert a'
similar defense.
As previously noted, certain traditional defenses, such as "dimin-
ished responsibility" and mistake of fact, recognize that individually
subjective factors may excuse criminal behavior or serve to mitigate
the punishment for it.1°4 These defenses are available to both im-
migrants and non-immigrants. Thus, immigrants do have some means
for asserting their cultural differences as a defense for crimes. Fairness
demands that these newcomers be precluded from receiving an ad-
ditional protection, under the "cultural defense,"'' 5 that is not af-
forded to the majority of the population. In short, the formal
recognition of the "cultural defense" would be unfair to society in
general.
D. Upholding the Principle of Legality
The fourth major problem associated with recognizing the "cultural
defense" as an exception to the "ignorance is no excuse" maxim is
the defense's violation of the principle of legality."°6 The underlying
theory behind the principle of legality, in relation to criminal law,
is that "no conduct may be held criminal unless it is precisely described
in a penal law."'' 0 7 The principle emphasizes the importance of the
ability to rely upon the authority of those laws.'0 8 Under the principle
of legality, the necessary elements of a legal order are that rules of
law with "objective meanings" are declared by "competent officials,"
and only those meanings of the rules are the law.' ° 9 A legal order
"opposes objectivity to subjectivity, judicial process to individual
'" See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
,, The "additional protection" referred to in the text is the exception to the
"ignorance is no excuse" doctrine that the "cultural defense" affords immigrants.
"' See generally J. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 24, at 364.
,, HALL, supra note 1, at 28.
The principle has two corollaries: "penal statutes must be strictly construed, and
they must not be given retroactive effect." Id.
'"' Id. at 382.
'' HALL, supra note 1, at 383.
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opinion, [and] official to lay" opinion.' 0 Thus, "it would conflict
with the principle of legality," and the essence of a legal order, "to
treat a defendant in a criminal case as if the law were as [he] thought
it to be.'' 1 '
The "cultural defense" conflicts with the principle of legality.
Under the defense, the newcomers' ignorance of United States law is
excused. Thus, their opinions and ideas about the laws will be placed
above the laws as declared by the officials. "The survival of the
principle of legality requires the preservation of the definiteness of
the rules, which must not be dissolved by the incompatible recognition
of the opinions of litigants and lawyers as authoritative.""' Since
the "cultural defense" violates this principle, it should not be rec-
ognized.
V. CONCLUSION
The recent increase in the numbers of foreign immigrants and
refugees who are settling in the United States has placed a tremendous
burden on the legal system and public. The public feels directly
the conflicts that occur between the cultures that newcomers bring
from their homelands and United States culture whenever these
newcomers participate in native customs that are crimes against in-
dividuals or against society. The trial courts, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys are also affected by these cultural conflicts. In some areas of
the country, court calenders are crowded with cases involving crimes by
immigrants. It is the courts, therefore that must ultimately determine
what role the cultural factors will play in the criminal prosecution of
the immigrants.
To date, the courts have apparently followed the maxim that "ig-
norance of the law is no excuse." This maxim precludes the use of
the "cultural defense," which asserts that the foreign-born defendant
should be excused for his criminal behavior because he could not
have formed the requisite mental state to commit the crime. The
courts' current approach is wise for several reasons. First, there are
other traditional defenses under which the immigrants may assert
'I Id.
W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 24, at 364.
,2 HALL, supra note i, at 386. ("[Tlhe doctrine is necessary to the maintenance of
the objective morality of the community.") Id.
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their cultural differences as a defense to crimes. These defenses may
not afford exactly the same protection as the "cultural defense," but
they are adequate in light of the remaining reasons for disallowing
the "cultural defense."
One of the other reasons for refusing to recognize formally the
"cultural defense" is the difficulty in defining the group of defendants
who may use it. The definition process has two stages. The first
stage involves separating the bona fide immigrant groups from other
groups, such as native minorities, who seek to circumvent the criminal
justice system by taking advantage of the defense. The second stage
involves separating the individual defendants who may legitimately
assert the defense from those who have lived in the United States
long enough to become "enculturated."
An additional reason for disallowing the "cultural defense" is the
potential reduction in the educational effect of the criminal law on
the immigrants' behavior. If the newcomers are not informed, through
criminal prosecution, of the laws of their adopted country, then they
will not as readily conform their customs to those laws. Such con-
formance is necessary to serve the larger interests of society as a whole.
Another reason for excluding the "cultural defense" is the unfair
policy that it would promote towards the majority who could not use
it. The "ignorance is no excuse" maxim is deeply entrenched in the United
States judicial system. Immigrants should not be afforded a special ex-
ception to this maxim at the expense of other citizens who must strictly
obey the rule.
The final argument against the use of the "cultural defense" by
recent immigrants is that the defense will violate the principle of
legality. Recognition of the defense would place the opinions of the
defendants and their attorneys above the legal orders created by
official lawmakers. Thus, the criminal law would lose its authority.
For all of these reasons, the American judicial system and the
American public should not be subjected to the "cultural defense."
The defense is ridden with negative repercussions that outweigh the
potential benefits to immigrant groups. These groups have and will
embellish society with their diverse customs and beliefs. The
exposure to foreign lifestyles promotes understanding and respect
for the immigrant groups and their native countries. However,
these positive effects will be nullified if United States residents are
threatened by the crimes of newcomers who are excused from
punishment, and if United States courts, which are already bur-
dened by the influx of immigrants who are ignorant of the criminal
1986l
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laws, are further deluged by other defendant groups who seek the
shelter of the "cultural defense."
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